The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6061-2100 and Collie, David R. 2007. The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

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Abstract

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path being allowed to become negative.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	28 Oct 2022 10:18
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77774

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