A detail-free mediator

Vida, Peter and Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6061-2100 2012. A detail-free mediator. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

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Abstract

We present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a deterministic function of the private messages. The extension captures situations in which people engage in face-to-face communication and can observe the opponent's face during the conversation before choosing actions in some underlying game. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game approximately coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of any underlying game.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	28 Oct 2022 10:20
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77933

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