Approximating solutions for nonlinear dynamic tracking games

Behrens, Doris and Neck, Reinhard 2015. Approximating solutions for nonlinear dynamic tracking games. Computational Economics 45 (3) , pp. 407-433. 10.1007/s10614-014-9420-4

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Abstract

This paper presents the OPTGAME algorithm developed to iteratively approximate equilibrium solutions of ‘tracking games’, i.e. discrete-time nonzero-sum dynamic games with a finite number of players who face quadratic objective functions. Such a tracking game describes the behavior of decision makers who act upon a nonlinear discrete-time dynamical system, and who aim at minimizing the deviations from individually desirable paths of multiple states over a joint finite planning horizon. Among the noncooperative solution concepts, the OPTGAME algorithm approximates feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium solutions, and the open-loop Nash solution, and the cooperative Pareto-optimal solution.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Mathematics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Publisher:	Springer Verlag
ISSN:	0927-7099
Funders:	Austrian Science Foundation
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	3 May 2016
Last Modified:	18 Nov 2024 04:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/89900

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